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Abstract
As cloud computing becomes an increasingly dominant means of providing computing resources world-
wide, legal and regulatory issues associated with the cloud also become more pronounced. In particular,
there is a heightened focus on ensuring the privacy and integrity of end-users' personal data. At present, the
cloud is opaque, a black-box. The technical means for enforcing and demonstrating compliance with data
management practices lag behind legal and regulatory aspirations.
After reviewing existing methods for containing, accessing and encrypting data, we introduce Information
Flow Control (IFC) as a technology enabling auditable, ne-grained management as data moves throughout
systems. We describe how IFC oers potential in improving the visibility and control over data ows within
and between cloud services and cloud-hosted applications. This is demonstrated through real-world legal/
regulatory examples, which show how IFC can help satisfy data management obligations, and improve the
accountability of responsible parties.
I. Responsibility in the cloud
Cloud computing is an industry with rapid and continued growth, reecting the eciencies and cost
reductions that can be obtained through economies of scale, improved global accessibility, and simplied,
`outsourced' management and conguration.
Legal issues concerning data in the cloud derive primarily from four areas: contract; data protection; law
enforcement; and regulatory and common law protections for particularly sensitive domains such as health,
nance, duciary relations, and intellectual property assets.
From a technical perspective, these legal requirements all impose information management obligations on
the transmission and sharing of data within cloud-hosted applications and services. They may restrict how,
when, where, and by whom, data may ow and be accessed. These issues must be managed not only between
applications, but through the entire, potentially global, cloud supply chain.
Currently, cloud providers employ access controls, to prevent unauthorised access to data and services;
and containment mechanisms, to prevent data leaking between tenants (those consuming cloud services)
using shared infrastructure. But these tend to be security rather than compliance focused, often applying at
specic application, system or user boundaries. Further, cloud services tend to be opaque and black-box in
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2nature. Despite some management tools (that depend on the service model/application), there is typically
little scope for tenants to visualise, let alone specify, how data should be managed once within the cloud,
nor the precise circumstances in which data can be transferred.
Tenants and providers must ensure and demonstrate that they meet their legal and regulatory obligations.
However, current technical mechanisms oer limited means for controlling data from afar, and insucient
tools for determining compliance and/or apportioning responsibility. This means that providers|and poten-
tially their whole supply chain|must be trusted to act appropriately. This not only hinders accountability,
but represents a barrier to cloud adoption, particularly for personal data use and for industries such as
healthcare and nance where additional regulatory requirements pertain.
It is clear that more is required. We argue that one way forward is for exible data-centric technical
mechanisms that enable the visibility and control of data ows inside, within and between cloud services. As
an exemplar, we introduce our ongoing work on Information Flow Control (IFC), to explore in this article
how greater technical controls over data ows can allow parties to better manage their legal obligations,
improve accountability, and oer veriable data trails for audit and compliance.
Note that our focus here is on management and compliance with respect to civil, administrative and
criminal law obligations and responsibilities. Surreptitious actions, such as those by government agencies
or malicious parties, are beyond the scope of this particular discussion, and must be addressed with robust
international policy eorts and domestic legal reforms.
A. Parties and relationships
Commercial cloud services are oered by providers, which may use third-party (sub-provider) services as
part of their supply chain. A cloud service is used by tenants who contract with the provider in order to
leverage the service. Tenants use cloud services to host applications and services that are, in turn, used by
end-users.
Cloud services therefore involve a series of direct (typically contractual) relationships between: a) end-
users and tenants; b) tenants and cloud providers; and c) cloud providers and sub-providers. Data ows tend
to correspond to these relationships.
B. Responsibility and compliance
Legal and regulatory considerations for data ows in the cloud revolve around four primary dimensions:
1) Contractual obligations. Cloud services involve a number of contracts such as service level agree-
ments (SLAs) and privacy policies. These documents impose obligations for which it would be valuable
to audit data ows and therefore a) verify compliance; b) detect breaches; and c) apportion responsi-
bility. Although many cloud contracts appear non-negotiable, in practice there may be some room for
negotiation|particularly for larger organisations [1]. A benet of mechanisms that enable managed,
auditable data ows is an increased likelihood of negotiable terms between dierent parties, in addition
to giving tenants and end-users a greater capacity for control.
2) Data protection. Data protection laws, adopted in many countries, place obligations and responsi-
bilities on tenants and providers for the management of personal data. The fundamental premise of
data protection is that all uses of information identiable to an individual should be strictly regulated
and controlled, with various audit mechanisms, ow and purpose restrictions, and penalties (in theory)
for non-compliance. Building on the foundation of the OECD's 1981 Guidelines on the Protection of
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, the most inuential set of laws are those concerning
the European Union's Directive 95/46/EC and the new EU Regulation currently under negotiation. In
some jurisdictions, such as the United States, data protection regulates only some industries and types
of processing, rather than providing a general schema for all data processing. In this article, we draw
particularly on the EU data protection authorities' 2012 guidelines for cloud operators [2], which set
out rigorous requirements for technical and organisational measures that ensure transparency, purpose
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are general, and therefore can operate in other data protection regimes, be they the US or elsewhere.
3) Law enforcement access for crime/national security. For global businesses with international clien-
tele, there is increasing pressure to report on government demands for data. In this article, we
draw particularly on the recent high-prole Microsoft-Ireland case, and on the potential for IFC
to track unauthorised (direct requests to cloud providers) and authorised (via warrant and mutual
legal assistance treaties, possibly only to an accredited public institution) data ows out of a specied
territory or agreed location.
4) Regulatory and common law protections for particularly sensitive domains such as health,
nance, doctor-patient and lawyer-client relations, as well as, in a commercial context, protection
of trade secrets and other intellectual property.
Within each of these areas, the physical (geo)location of data, storage, processing and equipment are
particularly pertinent considerations [3], [4], as these are all relevant factors in determining legal jurisdiction
to legislate, adjudicate and enforce obligations on otherwise delocalised cloud operations.
Dierent types/instances of data can come with dierent obligations and responsibilities, meaning that
tenants may have a number of data management constraints, and therefore require exible technical controls.
The critical dimension that seems to be missing from existing legal and regulatory obligations, and the
way that providers have responded to date, are guarantees that responsibilities are being met: demonstrable
compliance through technical means. This article furthers the proposition that proper steps/policies should be
in place to show explicitly how, where, when and by whom data is accessed. This not only provides assurances
to cloud consumers and to authorities, but oers a veriable audit trail so that there is evidence available
if something goes wrong, or responsibility needs to be apportioned. This can consolidate and be reinforced
by external, general audits, to move beyond higher-level reactive checks and into proactive, data-centric and
context-aware compliance.
II. Data management mechanisms: the status quo
These legal and regulatory issues concern data. It follows that the technical mechanisms for data man-
agement directly aect the ability of a party to meet, demonstrably, their obligations. Currently, the well-
established and commercially deployed control mechanisms tend to focus more on security; compliance and
accountability, despite being crucial cloud considerations [5], are given considerably less attention.
Cloud service provisioning
The type of cloud service oering determines the capacity for management. Cloud oerings tend to be
described in terms of a service model, which reects the parts of the cloud stack that are managed by the
provider (Fig. 1). That is, the avour of the service model relates to the degree of control a tenant has over
the service. Generally, tenants have limited (if any) means to inuence or view those aspects managed by
the provider.
For Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), the cloud provider manages the low-level aspects (hardware, software-
hardware interfaces and isolation mechanisms), giving tenants the freedom to determine the operating system
(OS), software stack, and of course, deploy and manage their own applications. Software as a Service (SaaS)
is at the opposite end of the spectrum, where the entire application is oered and managed by the provider.
This might be a university email service run by a large webmail provider, for example. SaaS tenants have far
less freedom, as any management is determined by the conguration functionality oered by the application.
Platform as a Service (PaaS) oerings run tenant-provided applications on top of the cloud provider's software
and service stack. That is, the provider oers the runtime environment, and the tenant the application code.
For all service models, the tenant has a lack of control and visibility, to some degree, over various aspects of
service. (Note IaaS tenants may use pre-congured virtual machine images, and often leverage other provider-
managed services such as storage.) For end-users, the situation is similar to the SaaS provider-tenant scenario,
in that any controls to manage their data are determined by the functionality of the (tenant's) application.
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Figure 1: Cloud service provision models. The cloud provider manages all that is below the arrow, the tenant
manages that which is above.
This can be analogised to technical control over one's Facebook user data, or Amazon customer data, which
are determined by the privacy settings' functionality of those services. Cloud services may be composed.
For instance, Dropbox (a SaaS oering for end-users) runs over Amazon (an IaaS oering), and SalesForce
Heroku PaaS runs over Amazon IaaS. Thus it may not be clear to end-users, or even tenants, which oerings
comprise the service's supply chain and therefore where responsibility lies.
A. Containment
Given the shared nature of the cloud, a key focus has been on isolating tenants (data and processing)
in order to prevent information leakage. There are few mechanisms for tenants and providers to determine
if/when data has been leaked, e.g. as a result of some misconguration, software bug, or as a security issue.
A common approach involves containing tenants by allocating them their own virtual machines (VMs),
meaning that only the provider-managed hardware and hypervisor are shared between tenants. (Though
there may be other shared infrastructure such as storage services.) Each VM maintains its own OS and
the software layers above. This type of strong isolation may be appropriate for unrelated tenants, especially
those using an IaaS oering. More recently, containers have enabled strong isolation of tenants over a shared
OS. The goal of isolation is to segregate tenants, protecting their data and computation, and to limit a
tenant's (direct) knowledge of others.
Though strong isolation is of clear importance, many applications and services will require data sharing
across and outside of isolation boundaries. This may be in order to span a range of applications or to directly
access other service components and resources, e.g. storage or billing services. Such interactions are managed
through access controls.
B. Access controls
Access controls regulate the actions that a principal|human user, application, software, process, and so
on|may perform, e.g. to read or write data, recongure a system, use a particular service, etc. These actions
typically relate to data.
Applications/services use access controls to manage data they hold, through authentication (identication)
of the principal (\you are who you say you are") and authorising the actions the principal attempts to take.
Authorisation involves applying a policy at a particular policy enforcement point within the application/
service. This determines whether the action is allowed. As a simple illustration, one may log-in to a social
media platform (authentication), where authorisation rules ensure that one may only view a prole's detail
if they are `friends'. This would be evaluated on an attempt to view a prole.
Access controls tend to operate within the scope of the particular application/service. Policy is enforced
as the action is attempted, considering the principal(s) directly involved.
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provider, and provider{sub-provider interactions at the interface between them. These mechanisms typically
do not, of themselves, oer control beyond that point; e.g. they would not regulate the indirect interactions
between an end-user{sub-provider. Further, the application-centric nature of many access controls renders
it dicult to have a consistent management policy that can apply across the range of dierent applications
and services.
C. Encryption
The main roles encryption plays within the cloud are: a) to protect a communication channel, preventing
eavesdropping during transmission; and b) to protect data items when transferred outside their boundary
of control. Regarding the former, Transport Layer Security (TLS/SSL) transmission is commonplace, par-
ticularly in the post-Snowden era where large providers use encrypted communication channels, even within
their data centres [3].
As a tool of data management, encryption provides an orthogonal form of protection to the access controls
just described. Encryption does not restrict physical access to data, but rather, aects its usability by making
it unintelligible. Access to the (intelligble) data is regulated through the distribution of keys that enable
decryption. In a cloud context, this means that if a user places encrypted data in the cloud, this data will
not be accessible by the provider, or anyone else, unless they hold the requisite keys.
This brings a number of considerations (see [4] for discussion). First, key management is hard: keys must
be distributed to the relevant parties, and revoked (and reallocated) when conditions change. This comes
with overhead, and quickly becomes unmanageable in dynamic and distributed environments such as the
cloud. Second, being mathematically-based, there are no means for determining when, where and by whom
data was decrypted. This makes detecting leaks dicult and hinders accountability. We argue that even
the distribution of encrypted data should still be carefully managed, as a broken encryption scheme or
compromised key at any time in the future places the data at risk.
The practice of encrypting data before upload may be appropriate for storage services, and more generally
to protect against surreptitious access. However, many cloud service oerings entail data processing. This
generally requires the provider to have access to the customer's intelligible data (and/or their keys if data is
encrypted) to provide the service. There is ongoing work on homomorphic encryption, which allows operations
to be performed on encrypted data without revealing the plaintext [6], but the current state of the art is not
yet practical for use at scale.
D. The need for more
These controls clearly have their place: containment prevents data leaking between tenants on shared
infrastructure, and access controls regulate the circumstances in which particular applications/services (data)
may be accessed. However, these mechanisms were not designed to demonstrate compliance with respect to
contractual, legal and regulatory obligations, nor to account for the fact that applications and the provision
of cloud services necessarily entail data sharing.
To improve accountability, there is a clear role for technical mechanisms that:
 Enable data to be managed beyond application and system boundaries, i.e. within and between
applications, cloud services, and throughout the cloud supply chain. This is particularly relevant as
cloud becomes part of wider architectures, such as for the Internet of Things.
 Facilitate visibility to determine when/where data ows, to help identify the occurrence of any leakage
and/or other data obligation failures. This provides evidence indicating who may (or may not) be
responsible.
 Flexibly deal with the subtleties and nuances of data management requirements, which may be con-
textual, or apply only to certain data items, etc.
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Current cloud mechanisms depend heavily on trust|trust between parties that data will be properly man-
aged once it is transferred beyond their direct control. To improve on this, we are developing mechanisms for
managing information ows within and between cloud services and applications. The aim is to complement
other control and management mechanisms, by providing visibility and control across isolation, application
and system boundaries, and providing evidence for compliance purposes.
Controlling Information Flow
Conceptually, controlling data ows involves coupling data to a known management policy that can
be enforced wherever the data ows. This is implemented by tagging data, where lightweight tags|
representing particular management aspects/concerns|are tightly linked with data. The policy is
enforced when tagged data then ows between components of the system, within or between machines.
Enforcement of policy may involve allowing or preventing information ows, or transforming (and
re-tagging) data so that it will be allowed to ow. Importantly, this approach means that data
management policy need not be encoded within the software-logic (i.e. application-centric), but rather
enables separation of policy that can therefore apply across dierent infrastructures and be managed
over time.
A. Information Flow Control (IFC)
Information Flow Control (IFC) is a data ow control model that enforces policy against every ow in the
system. To achieve IFC, tags are linked with data to represent various properties and policies concerning the
data. Entities that can touch data are similarly tagged in order to control the ows between them. The tags
are collected into two labels: a) a secrecy label representing the data's privacy/condentiality/sensitivity;
and b) an integrity label representing the data quality/provenance/authority.
The state of the labels represents a security context, and a ow is only permitted if the security context
of the data and entity accord. This is through tag-matching rules (evaluated by subset relationships) [7]
that ensure that outgoing ows that would violate privacy/condentiality are prevented (secrecy) and that
incoming data has certain (quality/sanitisation etc.) properties (integrity). Or in simple terms, secrecy
constraints concern the decision to release data, integrity constraints the decision to receive. For example,
data tagged as private-bob in its secrecy label can only ow to a processing component that contains a secrecy
tag private-bob in its secrecy label, e.g. ensuring that data produced by Bob's mobile phone is only processed
by a cloud application running on his behalf. Similarly, a storage component tagged as validated-data in its
integrity label can only input data that has gone through some system validation or sanitisation process and
has been assigned a tag validated-data in its integrity label.
Importantly, IFC provides the exibility for ne-grained, data-centric control, and is inherently dynamic,
meaning that ows can be managed in accordance with changes in context. Decentralised Information Flow
Control (DIFC) [8] allows IFC tags to be managed in a decentralised fashion meaning that policy can be
expressed and tailored to infrastructure, application or even individual, end-user specic needs.
Further, policy is enforced against every ow in the system, which is made possible by the fact that each
entity runs in a security context, dened by its labels. This facilitates a more complete audit, as the policy
decision for every ow can be logged, as well as the security contexts for the entities involved.
B. IFC in the cloud
There has been a good deal of research into IFC, as well as some practical realisations. Only recently has
IFC been considered for cloud computing [9]. We have developed a full DIFC prototype for PaaS oerings,
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within a virtual machine), with an integrated middleware responsible for policy-compliant inter-machine
data exchange. Full technical details of this work are provided in [7].
IFC can help ensure that data is being properly protected by acting as a safety net around the isolation
mechanisms for all service models. Further, it operates beyond specic enforcement points, thus providing
the mechanisms to secure information ows across various parties and aspects of the infrastructure. Other
approaches to wide-scale policy enforcement, such as those leveraging sticky policies [10], are complementary
as they tend to be at higher levels of abstraction, where policy denition and interpretation is comparatively
heavyweight.
As a general approach, IFC oers exibility over who manages policy. For instance, end-users are able to
express IFC policy for their data, which is respected by the tenant applications and cloud infrastructure.
Alternatively, IFC policy can be managed by the cloud provider without tenant involvement to guarantee,
for example, data-location requirements as in [11]. A mixture of these is also possible.
IFC can only provide guarantees above the level at which it is enforced. For instance, our implementation
enforces IFC at the OS kernel level, and thus protects user-space ows but not lower-level aspects, e.g.
concerning the hardware or the hypervisor. So we assume that a cloud provider that implements IFC does
not actively try to circumvent its enforcement. This is not unreasonable, since a degree of trust in the cloud
provider is implied by the use of a cloud service. This is reinforced by contractual relationships between
tenants and cloud providers, and the role of regulators that operate in many jurisdictions. There is work
on using trusted hardware components to enforce geo-location guarantees for cloud instances [12]. A similar
approach could be taken for IFC policy enforcement.
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Figure 2: Separating personal and public data.
This gure shows two tenant applications, where `App 1' is labelled as dealing with personal
information. The data from `App 1' can only ow to entities marked as properly dealing with personal
information, and thus cannot ow to the `Advertising' service which is not certied to process personal
data. IFC ensures this constraint is adhered to as it ows throughout the cloud, including to sub-
providers and other third parties. This is visible through audit, as each ow is recorded.
IV. Flow controls and legal case studies
IFC oers an additional security mechanism for cloud services and also provides the technical means for:
a) greater control over data ows, helping parties to meet their data management responsibilities; and b)
improved accountability, through providing detailed logs to demonstrate compliance and/or failures. This is
illustrated in the following examples.
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IFC is an eective mechanism for enforcing policy requirements set out in contracts and data protection
regulations. We take as an example the stringent standards set out in the 2012 opinion by European data
protection authorities on cloud computing [2], which requires cloud providers and tenants to implement
technical and organisational measures guaranteeing to a cloud client (tenant or end-user):
 Transparency. There must be transparency concerning all sub-providers contributing to the provision
of the cloud service, as well as the physical locations of all data centres in which personal data may
be processed (including storage, caching and computation). These must be auditable by the tenant or
end-user or by a certied third-party. Fig. 2 illustrates that IFC can help improve audit by providing
ne-grained, data-centric constraints over data ows within the cloud, increasing visibility to those
involved, rather than relying on external physical/process audits and certications that may go out of
date, e.g. by a simple conguration change. Auditable data ows provide the means for identifying
(and bounding the fall-out from) situations of misconguration or compliance failures. Though the
Figure focuses on sub-provider relations, location constraints can also be taken into account|we have
explored this [11], and revisit it in the Microsoft-Ireland example below.
 Purpose specication. It must be guaranteed that personal data is not used in ways incompatible
with the purposes for which it was originally provided. IFC provides information on the paths data
has taken, which can be used to indicate proper usage at a ne-grained, data-centric level. Further,
if the purpose can be encapsulated within labels, it could proactively ensure that purpose constraints
are met.
 Data erasure. Guarantees must be in place to ensure that personal data no longer required is erased or
truly anonymised. If this data cannot be erased due to legal retention rules (e.g. tax regulations), access
to this personal data should be blocked. Since personal data may be kept in a number of locations,
each instance (including fragments) must be erased irretrievably, including from backup, caches and
potentially log les. IFC assists with erasure concerns. First, as data ows are audited, it is possible to
determine where data has gone, and thus can ensure (veriably) that the deletion requests are directed
to all relevant entities. Further, if the erasure operation is a dened, encapsulated process, IFC could
provide evidence that data was moved through a deletion operation (i.e. similar to recording what was
sent to `Trash').
B. Microsoft-Ireland: Location and law enforcement
Our second example concerns the ongoing Microsoft-Ireland legal dispute, in which a search warrant issued
in a US drug trial has been claimed to extend to accessing a Microsoft customer's email data held exclusively
in Ireland. Microsoft and a number of interested parties are appealing against the decision on the basis that it
involves evading the EU-US Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), which ordinarily governs cross-border
law enforcement requests to access personal data.
In this example, IFC oers the potential to regulate and audit data ow across jurisdictions, ensuring that
any transfer of Irish user data to US authorities aligns to a visible, auditable and traceable process. This is
illustrated in Fig. 3. The data residing in Ireland is tagged [Ireland] to represent this fact. For data to move
across jurisdictions, the integrity tags require successful passage through a privileged Government Cross
Border Transfer (GCBT) process, which if appropriate, changes the tags of the data to make it suitable to
ow to [US]. The GCBT could reect the application of an MLAT-approved request, but also oers more,
in that any transfer abroad is forced through the process.
This example illustrates several benets of an IFC approach. First, it shows the containment of data
by location according to the axed integrity tags. Data cannot simply ow to the US (or indeed other
jurisdictions); it must travel a certain path. Second, all ows are recorded, including the ows in and out of
the GCBT process. This means the data transferred can be audited, for example by Irish public authorities,
to ensure that only data processed according to an MLAT-approved request is transferred. There is also the
potential for individuals to verify that their information has not been transferred abroad. However, as this
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Figure 3: Illustration of the Microsoft-Ireland situation, where IFC can regulate the ow of information to the
US for law enforcement, forcing it through a cross-border transfer process.
is not always appropriate for cases of law enforcement, access to the audit log would likely be protected
through access controls.
The IFC approach we propose provides a stronger safety net than the current situation, when both MLAT
and non-MLAT-processed requests are invisible and trust-based, both to individuals and to authorities, with
few (technical) guarantees regarding data transfers.
C. Strict processing constraints, e.g. health data
Personal health data is intrinsically sensitive, but it can also be useful for medical research, and is essential
for population health studies. For personal data to be used for medical research purposes, there are generally
strict requirements about informed consent, anonymisation processes and appropriate ethics and governance
frameworks. IFC can help ensure and provide evidence that these constraints and requirements are respected.
For example, Fig 4 illustrates a simplied scenario concerning consent and anonymisation (in practice, more
checks may be necessary) where:
 An anonymisation process (Anonymiser) takes personal medical data as input, producing an anonymised
(according to some approved algorithm) version as an output.
 Integrity constraints ensure that the Anonymiser can only receive data where patients have consented
to its use in medical research (i.e. with the tag consent). This allows a veto for those concerned about
possible re-identication, or use of their data for research more generally.
 The Anonymiser outputs data with an integrity tag (anon) marking that the data has gone through
the designated anonymisation process. The (personal) secrecy tag is removed, given the changed level
of sensitivity.
 The Medical Research Database is tagged such that it will only receive|or be willing to accept, e.g.
for reasons of liability and responsibility|data that has been anonymised, and where consent has been
given.
 Individual researchers/projects are bound by same IFC constraints as the Medical Research Database.
In transacting with the Medical Research Database, additional controls|such as dierential pri-
vacy [13] techniques|could also apply.
We present this example to show how IFC can assist in the managing of particularly sensitive data and
where additional regulatory requirements may pertain. Here the only means for personal data to ow to
researchers is through a particular, designated anonymisation process, where consent is a prerequisite. As
all ows are recorded, this can be audited. It allows patients who gave consent to see whether their data has
actually been staged for research use. More complex constraints are also possible, such as consenting for use
only in particular research projects.
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Data processing regimes
The examples demonstrate the eect of the ow controls to essentially isolate (or more accurately, ensure
non-interference of) data transmission and processing. This essentially sets up a data processing regime,
potentially down to the level of a data-item, where ows of that data are transparent, and importantly, the
ow of data into and out of that regime can be tightly managed. If the high-level management concerns can
be specied in tags, then they can be technically enforced.
One can envisage cloud providers leveraging such mechanisms to oer services based on the processing
regime, rather than on infrastructure aspects such as the service model. Sector-specic clouds, such as a
Financial Services Authority compliant cloud are feasible, where data is guaranteed only to ow to processes
certied as compliant with particular requirements. There is also the potential for tenants to dene their
own regimes. The extra control and transparency should improve levels of trust in cloud services [5], and
therefore encourage cloud uptake; while eecting such controls imposes comparatively little eort on the
cloud provider when compared to segregated infrastructure oerings.
There is ongoing discussion concerning the current conation of legal jurisdiction and physical location.
IFC is relevant to this, as it can ensure particular data management aspects based on and/or irrespective
of the physical location of technical infrastructure. See [3] for discussion.
V. Moving forward
Though we argue that ow control oers a way forward in assisting with legal and regulatory dimensions
of cloud computing, it is a novel area and research is ongoing. To date, there are no commercial IFC
deployments by cloud services. Further work is needed to bring IFC to mainstream providers, including
the resolution of issues of trusted enforcement, global naming schemes, policy authoring mechanisms, tag
sensitivity and management, and so forth (see [7] for discussion). All of the examples discussed in this article
have nevertheless been implemented in our prototype, demonstrating the promise of such an approach, and
indicating that novel technical mechanisms can assist in enforcing higher level concerns. Again, our vision
for IFC is to complement other management technologies, be they well-established or the subject of ongoing
research.
It is also worth noting that the directions in cloud computing are towards smaller clouds. Ongoing research,
including cloudlets [14] and droplets [15], aims at reducing the size and scope of cloud deployments. Such
research is particularly important in the context of the emerging Internet of Things. With smaller clouds,
cloud instances may be dynamically moved between hosts, e.g. from a portable device (collecting data while
on the move) to a larger provider (to perform more complex processing on that data), facilitating mobility
and location-based services, exible processing, assisting in resource management, and so forth. Clouds can
also be dedicated to particular purposes, e.g. one for an individual's tness data, another concerning the
usage of appliances in the home. As clouds become smaller, their function becomes more obvious and explicit.
This could ease management by allowing more focused and informed policy denitions. Flow controls will
become even more relevant, as more interactions (data ows) will occur within and between these clouds.
Mechanisms enabling data management policy to apply continuously and consistently across applications
and infrastructure will be crucial.
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VI. Concluding remarks
As cloud computing becomes the dominant form of application and service provisioning, the need for more
proactive and integrated responses to legal and regulatory requirements grows stronger. We have considered
the primary contours of cloud providers' data management and compliance obligations. Tenant isolation plays
an important role, but as cloud services mature, ner-grained, auditable, data-centric control mechanisms
are required to help manage the information ows inherent in cloud provisioning.
We have argued that new technical mechanisms are required to enable control and transparency within
and across cloud services and cloud-hosted applications|to \see through the clouds". Towards this, we
have presented IFC as an exemplar, targeting issues of privacy, condentiality and data quality system-
wide, providing a means for demonstrable compliance with contractual and regulatory obligations. Such an
approach has the potential to raise the general level of trust and condence in cloud services.
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